Tensions are rising in the South China Sea with Chinese fishermen being involved in maritime incidents. In this article, the author discusses how rather than the fishing militia policy of the government, the primary factor behind the rising incidents is the ongoing trend of the outward expansion of the China’s marine fishery sector.
Amid rising tensions in the South China Sea, maritime incidents involving Chinese fishermen have increased over the past few years. Some of these incidents have sparked diplomatic and even security tensions between China and its neighbours. Mainstream media and a substantial body of academic literature attribute these fishing incidents and the growing presence of Chinese fishermen in disputed waters – particularly in the South China Sea – to China’s strategic and political motives, arguing that these fishermen are actually maritime militia who are positioned to conduct a “people’s war” at seas in any future conflicts. There is no secret that all the South China Sea claimant parties view their fishermen as important defenders of their respective claims in the disputed waters of the South China Sea. Both China and Vietnam have a long tradition of militia forces, and have taken efforts to expand their maritime militia forces in the past few years. Nonetheless, the maritime militia narrative is overblown for three key reasons.
First, it’s important to take a step back and remember that incidents involving Chinese fishermen have occurred worldwide, not just in disputed waters in the South China Sea and in the East China Sea where China has an interest in strengthening its maritime claims. Similar incidents have taken place in the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of South Korea, Russia, North Korea, Indonesia, Palau, Argentina, and South Africa. As a matter of fact, most of the fishing incidents involving Chinese fishermen take place in the Yellow Sea. It was reported that in the second half of 2014, over 29,600 Chinese fishing ships had illegally entered South Korea’s exclusive waters. Even in the South China Sea, fishing incidents involving Chinese fishermen do not only occur in the disputed waters of the Spratly Islands, but also in other parts of the region, such as in the waters near the Philippines’ Batanes archipelago and Taiwanese waters near the shore of Tongsha Island. All of this suggests that a primary factor behind rising numbers of incidents involving Chinese fishermen globally is the ongoing, outward expansion of China’s marine fishery sector in general. Faced with depleted traditional fishing grounds near China’s coast and excess capacity in the fishing industry, Chinese fishermen have ventured into new waters to stay in business.
Second, the maritime militia narrative is overly state-centric, and forgets that fishermen and local governments are individual decision-makers driven by self-interest as much as jingoism. Fishermen are primarily self-motivated economic players, driven by profit. In the case of the South China Sea, the government’s maritime militia policy certainly encourages Chinese fishermen to fish at the frontlines of maritime disputes. Just as large of a consideration, however, are three high-value marine species: giant clam, red coral and sea turtles. These species are generally found in shallow waters close to the disputed features in the South China Sea. Furthermore, the reach of the central state has always been limited in rural areas, particularly in coastal fishing villages. Under the country’s zoning regulations, distant-water fishing and fishing under bilateral agreements with foreign countries are both under the jurisdiction of the central government while offshore fishing and inshore fishing are under the jurisdiction of local governments. This is to say, fishery issues in the South China Sea are under the jurisdictions of Hainan provincial government, which is also interested in ensuring that the lucrative fishing industry continues to benefit the province and its fishing constituents.
Third, while it is true that the Chinese government provides fishing fuel and ship construction subsidies to its fishermen, their genesis have little to do with the South China Sea disputes. The fishing fuel subsidy was introduced in 2006 as part of China’s overhaul of an agricultural subsidy aimed at boosting fishermen’s income and an effort to combat illegal fishing by squeezing “black ships” out of the market. The central government subsidy for upgrading and renovation of fishing vessels was introduced in 2012. This was also a nationwide policy and one of the key objectives was to phase out the very damaging bottom trawler, canvas stow-net fishing, and large single-ship light-luring purse-seiners. Furthermore, the special fishing fuel subsidy for fishing in the Spratly Islands was introduced in 1995, long before the South China Sea disputes emerged as a key security issue. The main objective of the subsidy was to cover a portion of fishermen’s excessive fuel costs for long-distance fishing. According to Article 3 (15, 17) of China’s Spratly Island Fishing Regulations, the fishermen are required to keep a reasonable distance away from the islands, reefs, and oil rigs controlled by foreign countries in the disputed areas and refrain from confrontational actions.
[ms-protect-content id=”3162″]Rather than the fishing militia policy of the government, the primary factor behind the rising incidents involving the Chinese fishermen is the ongoing trend of the outward expansion of the country’s marine fishery sector, which is attributed to excess capacity coupled with depleting fishermen resources in China’s traditional fishing grounds. China’s fishery sector has transformed from predominantly inland and inshore to increasingly offshore and into the distant waters. From 1999 to 2010, the outward expansion of China’s marine fishery sector had been largely credited to fishermen’s own economic motivation, industrial interest, as well as some support from the local government. During this period, the central government stressed aquaculture development to meet the country’s rising demand for aquatic products and implemented the zero-growth policy to control the growth of the marine fishery sector. But this changed after 2010 when central government shifted its attention from control to support for the outward expansion of the marine fishery sector to meet the country’s rising demand for fishery products.
With income growth, Chinese consumers are switching from grain-based diet to nutrition-based food consumption, and this elevated fishery products as the most important source of high-quality animal protein. In 2012, capita consumption of aquatic products in China’s urban and rural areas reached 15.5 kilograms and 5.3 kilograms respectively, more than doubling in the past 20 years. Fishery products now make up one-third of Chinese consumers’ animal protein intake, much higher than the global average, according to China’s Fisheries Yearbook 2015. In the face of mounting challenges, the Chinese government plans to achieve national food security by embracing the notion of “blue granary or a marine-based food security” originally proposed by Tang during the global food crisis in 2007. Tang argued that the development of the fishery sector would not only meet the country’s growing demand for aquatic products but would also mitigate the country’s land and water shortage problems. The “blue granary” concept immediately attracted attention from academic researchers, media, and policy makers. Subsequently, more research was commissioned and high profile policy documents at both regional and national level were introduced by the government to push forward this “blue granary” concept.
A report in 2010, produced by a high level task force working on strengthening the country’s DWF sector, stressed that China cannot merely rely on its resources on land and its territorial waters and EEZs to satisfy the country’s growing demand for food. Instead, China should actively explore and utilise ocean resources, particularly marine biological resources in the high seas for the largest supply of protein. In 2011, fishery products were officially added to China’s “vegetable basket”. The vegetable basket refers to a project introduced by the Ministry of Agriculture in 1988 in a bid to improve production and marketing of vegetables and foodstuffs. The central government allocated RMB 100 million to boost the supply of fishery products and safeguard the country’s food security. The fund was increased to 200 million in 2012.
In February 2013, China’s State-Council held the first meeting on marine fishery development and one month later, the State Council published Several Advices on Promoting Marine Sustainable and Healthy Development. Being the first state-level marine fishery development document, it clearly stated basic principles, target missions, and supporting policies for taking marine fishery development to the next stage. It was then clear that marine fishery development would be supported by a powerful strategy. In June 2013, at the National Tele-Conference on Efforts to Develop a Modern Fishing Industry, China’s vice premier Wang Yang highlighted that amid the country’s severe scarcity of land and water resources, the task of meeting the ever rising demand for food calls for grand resources, food security strategy, and a well-supported diversified food supply. He added that China has vast marine territories and abundant fishery resources that offer great potential for future development, and thus developing a modern fishing industry will boost the supply of fishery products and meet the rising demand for high quality animal protein, and contribute to the country’s food security.
Apart from the central government, local governments also promoted the development of “blue granary”. To guide the fishery industry development during the 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020), the Shandong Government issued an official document regarding the construction of “blue granary” and to ensure food security by upgrading the fishery industry by December 2014. The Shandong Government also invested over RMB 36.6 billion for developing the “blue granary”: aquaculture, marine fishery, distant waters fishing, fishery processing, and fishing tourism. In addition, the Qingdao City Government also published the document Implementation Opinions on Accelerating the Construction of a Blue Granary which promises supporting policies for developing “large-tonnage, high-power steel boats” and funding for a “multi-channel marketing campaign” to draw investors to local fishing firms targeting the high seas.
Although the rapid development of aquaculture successfully replaced the marine catch sector as the biggest contributor to the supply of fishery products, the country’s marine catch sector is still under huge pressure to expand. For starters, aquaculture has a direct linkage to marine capture fisheries because fresh fish and fishmeal are important food sources for aquaculture. It is estimated that one-third of China’s marine catch is trash fish, which is used to produce fishmeal, and China is by far the world’s largest importer of fishmeal. It imported more than 1.1 million tonnes per year. Example, while aquaculture produces abundant and cheap fishery products, the Chinese wealthy middle class consumers are increasingly concerned about the quality and safety of these fishery products. Fearful of widespread food safety scandals in China, they demand for more wild marine catch. For instance, in the past, fishery products from Chinese DWF sector were predominantly sold at the international market to developed countries including Japan, European countries, and the United States. However, in recent years, with growing demand from Chinese wealthy middle class for high quality marine catch, over 60 percent of the catch from the country’s DWF are sold at the domestic market. To encourage DWF companies to bring their catch back to China, both central and local governments gave these companies huge subsidies. Lastly, China’s massive fish processing sector puts more pressure on the marine fishery.
Featured image courtesy: AP Photo/ Xinhua, Wang Cunfu, File
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About the Author
Zhang Hongzhou is a Research Fellow with the China Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. His main research interests include China and regional resources security (food, water and energy), China’s fishing policies and maritime security. His latest publications include the China’s Global Quest for Resources: Energy, Food and Water (Routledge, 2016, with Dr. Wu Fengshi). In addition, He has contributed over 20 papers to peer-reviewed journals including the Marine Policy, Pacific Review, WIREs Water, the Copenhagen Journal of Asia Studies, Harvard Asia Quarterly, the ISPI Analysis and Southeast Asia Studies, edited volumes, RSIS Working Paper Series and Policy Reports.
