China’s increasing engagement in Afghanistan reflects its interests in a stable immediate and wider neighbourhood, in particular since Beijing announced to revive the old Silk Routes. While tackling security remains a long-term goal there is scope for the Chinese government in the short and medium term to increase capacity and improve the situation in Afghanistan.
China’s role in Afghanistan is gradually evolving towards more engagement in various areas, which reflects the Chinese government’s concerns about deterioration of security and the impact this could have on the region as a whole. In particular since China announced to revive the old Silk Routes, its “One Belt One Road” (OBOR) initiative, it has even more an interest in a fairly stable immediate and wider neighbourhood. The Silk Road initiative has already given a new impetus to China’s infrastructure development in Pakistan, which had been promised Chinese investment of $45 billion in to construct a China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.1 This project, linking the deepwater port of Gwadar with the Chinese Western province Xinjiang, also includes co-operation to strengthen security – the greatest obstacle in Pakistan.
There is some hope in Afghanistan to benefit too from China’s investment and its aim to transform the region into a major trading hub. OBOR is almost cut out for Afghanistan’s need of infrastructure on the one hand and potential vast natural resources on the other hand. The country, at the crossroads of Central and South Asia, between India in the South and Russia in the North, would have he potential to become a part of China’s trade and investment network. Beijing already sent a signal towards more cooperation: During Abdullah’s visit to China both countries signed a memorandum of understanding on the OBOR initiative. Since this summer, China started operating the first cargo trains to Afghanistan (Hairatan and Mazar-e-Sharif) in frame of its OBOR network.2
However, the precarious and uncertain security situation is one of the main obstacles for China to implement major projects on the ground. China has failed once before in its attempt to invest into a large-scale project in Afghanistan: A planned $3 billion lease of the Aynak copper mine in 2008, by a consortium of Chinese state-owned companies, never launched mainly due to security issues. Ever since, China has remained reluctant to make large investments in Afghanistan.
Afghanistan is increasingly presenting a security concern to China, in particular since the large numbers of NATO forces had left the country by the end of 2014. Although this year the Taliban did not control as many districts as in 2015, they continued to carry out large-scale attacks throughout the country: In June, security guards at the Canadian embassy in Kabul were attacked; in July, Taliban militants drove a truckload of explosives into a foreign military facility; in August, militants stormed the campus of the American University of Afghanistan in Kabul; in September, the Taliban launched two major attacks in the capital within a couple of hours; in November, the Taliban stormed the German consulate in Mazar-e-Sharif.
[ms-protect-content id=”3162″]The Chinese government is concerned about the strengthening of the Taliban and other Islamist militant groups in Afghanistan due to possible links between these groups and the restless Muslim population in the neighbouring Xinjiang Province. In addition, Afghanistan’s instability might impact the stability of those countries that are key to China’s OBOR: Central Asia and Pakistan. The Chinese government traditionally refers to its principle of non-interference when it is reluctant to engage in security issues that carry too great risks to go wrong. Nevertheless, China gradually increased its security engagement globally, notably in Africa, although it is still limited to multilateral efforts, mainly UN peacekeeping missions, such as in Mali and South Sudan.
Similarly, Beijing has viewed any active role of engagement in matters of security in Afghanistan as risk to becoming a target of terrorist groups such as the Taliban. But recently, China has signalled its willingness to cooperate multilaterally on security issues concerning Afghanistan – it has now an anti-terrorism alliance with Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Tajikistan, to tackle the threat of terrorism and extremism.3 The four countries agreed on establishing a “four-country mechanism” to share intelligence and training. In addition, Beijing is strengthening its bilateral security ties with the Afghan government. In February, the chief of the Chinese army, Fang Fenghui, announced roughly $70 million of military aid to support the Afghan government’s anti-terrorism efforts.4 Beginning of July, the Afghan forces received the first batch of Chinese military equipment, and in August, both countries held their first strategic military dialogue.5 Allegedly Chinese security forces are also patrolling on the Afghan side near the border to China, although such reports have not been confirmed by the Afghan or Chinese government.6
Such efforts reflect Beijing’s growing worries about an eruption of insecurity that could endanger its security of its border province Xinjiang and its investments in the Central Asian region. However, China’s security role is unlikely to become crucial in order to turn around the situation on the ground in Afghanistan. Beijing has also made less typical diplomatic efforts to promote the Afghan peace process in frame of the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG). China along with Afghanistan, the US, and Pakistan has been holding talks in Islamabad since early 2016 to engage the Taliban in a reconciliation process.7 But the QCG has not achieved any progress as the Taliban are refusing to negotiate so far. Nevertheless it is important to keep the effort alive, not least because it reduces mistrust between Afghanistan and Pakistan. And China’s role as a mediator and confidence-builder may be crucial, as it appears that only Beijing’s constant pressure has kept its long-time ally Pakistan relatively peacefully engaged.
Beijing’s interest in benefiting from a reconstructed Afghanistan is also reflected in its evolving role in the area of economic and humanitarian development assistance – and it does have the means to increase its contribution. China is already evolving into a notable though not yet major player in Afghanistan in the area of economic and humanitarian assistance. China’s contribution is still small compared to that of the US or Europe and far from that the largest from donor of Afghanistan in the region – India, which has provided roughly $2 billion to date. But China has gradually increased its contributions to Afghanistan’s development in the last two to three years: it provided roughly $240 million in development assistance and aid between 2001 and 2013, and around $80 million in 2014 alone.8 During the visit of Abdullah Abdullah (the government’s chief executive) to China in May, both countries signed an agreement on technical cooperation (worth around $76 million) and on non-emergency humanitarian aid. China further pledged $8 million of emergency relief to Afghanistan in July.9
In addition, China is beginning to develop training and education programmes as well as to provide housing projects in urban centres. The Chinese government announced in 2015 to provide 500 scholarships for Afghan students to study in China, and training for 3,000 Afghan professionals in fields including anti-drug trafficking, agriculture, counterterrorism, and diplomacy.10 Following a cooperation agreement last November, China announced to build 10,000 residential flats in Afghanistan, worth roughly $80 million.11 Housing has become an issue in Afghanistan since large numbers of internally displaced people moved in recent years primarily from rural areas to urban centres to escape fighting and seek a better livelihood.12 The urban population is growing on average 6 percent per year (one of the highest rates in Asia), which has put more pressure on cities such as Kabul, Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, and Kandahar to provide resources and infrastructure.13
Because of its principles, China’s peace-building efforts could not include engaging in state building efforts, such as it is often the Western countries approach, but Beijing could increase its efforts in some areas that would support capacity-building of the Afghan government. The government, which is too preoccupied by the country’s worsening security situation to focus on solving its other problems, needs support in a range of areas, such as building capacities to fight corruption, drug trafficking, as well as to improve the weak institutional capacity. Afghanistan also still lags far behind many other low-income countries in social and physical infrastructure. Although China has increased its involvement in recent years, this still does not reflect the degree of its interest in Afghanistan and there is much potential to widen its scope of assistance.
Joint training, professionalisation programs for Afghans, or infrastructure projects, for instance, could be areas for Western countries, the US and Europeans in particular, to further engage China. The US and China have already been engaged in moderate training for Afghan security forces and Afghan diplomats for several years, and agreed upon new joint training programs for Afghan medical and veterinary professionals last year. Germany and China as well have taken first steps exploring this option: Both countries announced recently cooperation in third countries, notably in Afghanistan and agreed to establish a disaster management office and to cooperate on training Afghan personal in the mining sector.14 Any support by China to build the country’s infrastructure, to train Afghan professionals, or to keep an eye on stability and security, would help for what the international community as a whole has been trying to achieve ever since the Bonn Conference on Afghanistan in 2001.
In sum, while tackling security remains a long-term goal, there are a number of steps the Chinese government could take in the short and medium term, possibly in cooperation with other countries, to increase capacity and improve the situation in Afghanistan. China might be willing to invest more in Afghanistan if prospects in the country to enhance infrastructure network (roads, railways, etc.) are good enough. It could invest in Afghanistan’s infrastructure, for example via its Silk Road Fund or via the newly-established Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. In view to the insecurity and uncertainty however it appears unlikely for Afghanistan to become a key country in China’s OBOR plans in the near future, although Afghanistan could certainly benefit from the region’s improved infrastructure for trade and access to markets. In the short and medium term, Afghanistan might actually benefit more from China’s current approach to focus on smaller-scale projects rather than focusing on large-scale projects, as it became common for Chinese infrastructure investments. China could provide more funding to specific projects in Afghanistan, such as in the areas of health, education, and rural or urban development. For other actors in Afghanistan, in particular the US and Europeans, it is necessary to understand Beijing’s limits and choices in Afghanistan in order to further engage China and to pursue more cooperation.
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About the Author
Angela Stanzel joined the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) as a Policy Fellow for the Asia and China Programme in 2014. Before joining ECFR, Angela worked for the Körber Foundation in Berlin, for the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Brussels (Asia Programme) and the German Embassy in Beijing (cultural section). Alongside China’s history, politics and economics, her research work focuses on East and South Asia’s foreign and security policy.
References
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2. Eltaf Najafizada , “China lays new brick in Silk Road with first Afghan rail freight”, Bloomberg, 11 September 2016, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-11/china-lays-new-brick-in-silk-road-with-first-afghan-rail-freight.
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14. Press conference, Merkel and Li Keqiang, 13 June 2016, https://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/Content/DE/Mitschrift/Pressekonferenzen/2016/06/2016-06-13-merkel-mp-li.html;jsessionid=02E4169911C4DC6DDDF18A209C7C517A.s3t1.
