By Sara Hsu
China’s One Belt One Road initiative is vast and promises to greatly expand China’s soft power in Asia, Europe, and Africa by creating much-needed infrastructure. The US stance on OBOR, however, is unclear, and the lack of a clear stance on OBOR, China, and Asia in general, will ensure a reduced role for the US in the region.
Introduction
China’s expansive One Belt One Road initiative stretches across the continents of Asia, Europe, and Africa and promises to bring a range of infrastructure to numerous developing countries, potentially covering half of the world. The purpose of the project is to engage the nation abroad. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs aims specifically to boost intergovernmental communication to promote regional cooperation, coordinate infrastructure plans to ensure connection of infrastructure networks, encourage soft infrastructure development, and improve human connections through international exchanges.1
This is a massive undertaking, and many foreign countries have chosen to participate in order to benefit from infrastructure investment directly or indirectly, despite protests in some areas against environmental and human rights violations. The US position on OBOR, however, is unclear, and a lack of a clear stance has left the US looking on helplessly at the sidelines. This represents a more general failure of US foreign policy in the Asian region.
OBOR Benefits China
Focus on infrastructure allows China to employ its construction firms abroad and generate investment opportunities, both for itself and for other countries. Excess capacity in cement and steel enterprises can be used to provide materials for OBOR projects. OBOR will also help China gain access to trade with less developed countries by reducing trade costs due to improved transportation networks and enhanced trade agreements between nations.
Politically, the project strengthens China’s soft power abroad, boosting China’s stature as a global power. China earns political points for providing assistance to poor countries. The deliverables specified during China’s May 2017 Belt and Road Forum provide an intense work agenda for China, but also promise to massively bolster China’s involvement in Asia and beyond. These include: coordinating development strategies and infrastructure development, expanding industrialisation and trade, increasing financial cooperation, and focussing on people to people exchange.2 All of these items require negotiations with neighbouring governments, understandings based on mutual respect and benefits.
To some, the mutual benefits are clear. China has noted that increased cooperation with Qatar in OBOR can boost Qatar’s National Vision 2030.3 Lao officials have celebrated the fact that OBOR will cause their country to transform from a “land-locked country” into a “land-linked country”.4 Malaysia released a report in October stating that OBOR would create benefits for all participating countries, including Malaysia.5 In addition, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated in June that the OBOR will benefit both Russia and China.6
About the Author
Sara Hsu is an Associate Professor of Economics at the State University of New York at New Paltz, and have published over six books and fifteen journal articles on the Chinese economy and financial sector. Hsu is a Forbes contributor and a frequent guest on CGTN.
References
1. National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China. 2015. “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road”. http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html, March 28.
2. Xinhua. 2017. Full text: List of deliverables of Belt and Road forum. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-05/15/c_136286376.htm, May 15.
3. Xinhua. 2016. “China takes Qatar key partner for belt and road initiative: FM”. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-05/11/c_135351700.htm, May 11.
4. Hutt, David. 2017. “Laos is a key link for China’s Obor ambitions”, http://www.atimes.com/article/laos-key-link-chinas-obor-ambitions/, July 15.
5. Xinhua. 2017. “Malaysia says it stands to reap benefits from Belt and Road Initiative”, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/27/c_136710199.htm . October 27.
6. Baumgartner, Pete. 2017. “China’s Massive ‘One Road’ Project Largely Bypasses Russia, But Moscow Still On Board”, https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-china-one-belt-one-road-project-putin-xi/28579849.html, June 26.
7. Wu, Gang. 2017. SOEs Lead Infrastructure Push in 1,700 “Belt and Road” Projects. http://www.caixinglobal.com/2017-05-10/101088332.html, May 9.
8. Hsu, Sara. 2017. China’s New Silk Road Project May Be Too Big To Succeed. https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/china-silk-road_us_
5935a553e4b0099e7fae2fd2
9. Agencies. 2017. “As China opens its One Belt One Road summit, anti-CPEC protests erupt in PoK”, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/as-china-opens-its-one-belt-one-road-summit-anti-cpec-protests-erupt-in-pok/articleshow/58675499.cms, May 15.
10. Press Trust of India. 2017. “US Backs India On ‘One Belt One Road’, Says It Crosses ‘Disputed Territory’.” https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/on-belt-and-road-us-backs-india-says-it-crosses-disputed-territory-1758271, October 4.
11. IANS. 2017. “China says it’s not thrusting Belt and Road”, http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/china-says-its-not-thrusting-belt-and-road/articleshow/60971921.cms, October 6.
12. Trentmann, Nina. 2017. “Western Firms Bet Big on China’s Billion-Dollar Infrastructure Project”, https://www.wsj.com/articles/western-firms-bet-big-on-chinas-billion-dollar-infrastructure-project-1494790205, May 14.
13. Perlez, Jane. 2014. “U.S. Opposing China’s Answer to World Bank” https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/10/world/asia/chinas-plan-for-regional-development-bank-runs-into-us-opposition.html?_r=0., October 9.
14. Kim, Younkyoo and Fabio Indeo. 2013. The new great game in Central Asia post 2014: The US “New Silk Road” strategy and Sino-Russian rivalry. Communist and Post-Communist Studies 46 (2013) 275–286
